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ABSTRACT
The Pareto-like tail of the size distribution of ﬁrms can arise from random growth of productivity or
stochastic accumulation of capital. If the shocks that give rise to ﬁrm growth are perfectly correlated
within a ﬁrm, then the growth rates of small and large ﬁrms are equally volatile, contrary to what is
found in the data. If ﬁrm growth is the result of many independent shocks within a ﬁrm, it can take
hundreds of years for a few large ﬁrms to emerge. This paper describes an economy with both types
of shocks that can account for the thick-tailed ﬁrm size distribution, high entry and exit rates, and
the relatively young age of large ﬁrms. The economy is one in which aggregate growth is driven by
the creation of new products by both new and incumbent ﬁrms. Some new ﬁrms have better ideas
than others and choose to implement those ideas at a more rapid pace. Eventually, such ﬁrms slow
down when the quality of their ideas reverts to the mean. As in the data, average growth rates in
a cross section of ﬁrms will appear to be independent of ﬁrm size, for all but the smallest ﬁrms.
∗This paper has evolved from my Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis working papers no. 645 (October
2006), no. 649 (January 2007) and no. 657 (February 2008). The data and more detailed proofs are available
at www.luttmer.org. I thank Nathalie Pouokam for skillful research assistance. The views expressed herein
are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal
Reserve System.1. Iqwurgxfwlrq
Why does the employment size distribution of US ﬁrms look like a Pareto distribution,
with the fraction of ﬁrms with more than n employees roughly equal to n−ζ?W h y i s
the tail index ζ ≈ 1.05 barely high enough for the distribution to have a ﬁnite mean?
More than half of all ﬁrms with any employees have no more than four employees. But
there are also almost a thousand ﬁrms with more than ten thousand employees each,
and these ﬁr m se m p l o ya sm u c ha saq u a r t e ro ft h eU Sl a b o rf o r c e .W h a ta c c o u n t sf o r
the large amount of heterogeneity in ﬁrm size? How does this heterogeneity evolve over
time? Some benchmark answers to these questions are needed for the systematic use of
ﬁrm-level data in the study of aggregate growth and ﬂuctuations.
In the presence of decreasing returns or downward sloping ﬁrm demand curves, it
is possible that the highly skewed size distribution entirely reﬂects a highly skewed
productivity distribution. Such a productivity distribution can arise if productivity
growth is random and only suﬃciently productive ﬁrms can survive. Given iso-elastic
cost functions or demand curves, random productivity growth gives rise to Gibrat’s law,
which holds that ﬁrm growth rates are independent of size. A stationary size distribution
r e s u l t si fe m p l o y m e n ta ti n c u m b e n tﬁrms grows more slowly on average than aggregate
employment. This distribution has a tail index ζ just above 1 if cost parameters are
such that there is only a small gap between entrant and incumbent mean productivity
growth rates (Luttmer [2007]).1
This paper associates ﬁrm size not primarily with productivity diﬀerences, but with
organization capital (Prescott and Visscher [1980]) that can be accumulated through
investment over time. In the model, a ﬁr mp r o d u c e so n eo rm o r ed i ﬀerentiated com-
modities using labor and commodity-speciﬁc blueprints. An entrepreneur can set up a
new ﬁrm by producing a start-up blueprint. After that, the ﬁrm can use labor and any
of its blueprints to attempt to produce more blueprints for new commodities. Individual
blueprints can also become obsolete. The arrival rates of these two types of events are
independent and independent across blueprints. Absent other sources of heterogeneity,
1The ζ =1asymptote is known as Zipf’s law. See Axtell [2001] for recent evidence on the ﬁrm
size distribution showing that ζ slightly above 1 ﬁts the data well. Well-known empirical studies on
Gibrat’s law for ﬁrms, based on growth rate regressions that correct for selection, are Evans [1987] and
Hall [1987]. Sutton [1997] surveys the literature. Gabaix [1999] uses Gibrat’s law to interpret the city
size distribution and contains many useful references on the history of the subject. Rossi-Hansberg
and Wright [2007] develop a model of the ﬁrm size distribution in which there are many industries and
the ﬁrm size in any given industry follows a stationary process, instead of the non-stationary process
implied by Gibrat.
1this implies that the mean growth rate of a ﬁrm with more than a single blueprint is
independent of ﬁrm size–a weak version of Gibrat’s law. Averaging within the ﬁrm
implies that the variance of ﬁrm growth is inversely proportional to ﬁrm size, a vio-
lation of the strong form of Gibrat’s law according to which the entire distribution of
growth rates is independent of ﬁrm size. The economy exhibits balanced growth, and
increases in variety add to the aggregate growth rate, as in Romer [1990] and Young
[1998]. As long as there is entry, the size distribution will be stationary with a right tail
that behaves like n−ζ.
Independent within-ﬁrm replication avoids a problem that arises in economies with
only ﬁrm-wide productivity shocks. In Luttmer [2007], it takes a standard deviation
of ﬁrm employment growth of about 40% per annum to jointly account for the size
distribution and the 11% rate of ﬁrm entry observed in the data. This standard deviation
is within the range reported by Davis et al. [2007] for all ﬁrms, but implausibly high
for large ﬁrms. Here, large ﬁrms are very stable even when small-ﬁrm growth rates
are suﬃciently volatile to be consistent with the observed entry and exit rates. In the
simplest version of the model, though, this is too much of a good thing and leads to a
rather dramatic counterfactual implication: the median age of ﬁr m sw i t hm o r et h a nt e n
thousand employees is implied to be about 750 years. Stationarity and the weak version
of Gibrat’s law force mean incumbent growth rates to be below the growth rate of the
aggregate labor force, only about 1% per annum, and averaging within the ﬁrm reduces
variance by too much for “lucky” ﬁrms to become large in a relatively short amount of
time.
Newly collected data show that the median age of ﬁr m sw i t hm o r et h a nt e nt h o u s a n d
employees in 2008 was only about 75 years. With a 40% standard deviation of employ-
ment growth, an economy like Luttmer [2007] predicts about 100 years.2 But to account
for the relatively young age of large ﬁrms observed in the data, without assuming there
is a 30% chance that employment at WalMart will grow or shrink by more than 40%
over the next year, requires abandoning Gibrat’s law.
S u p p o s et h e r e f o r et h a ts o m en e wﬁrms enter with an initial blueprint of a higher
quality than other blueprints in the economy. The resulting higher proﬁts per blueprint
create an incentive to copy these blueprints at a higher rate if quality is inherited. If
copies stay within the ﬁrm, then these new ﬁrms will grow fast. If a ﬁrm’s quality
advantage is transitory, this rapid growth will come to an end eventually. A stationary
distribution with a tail index ζ above 1 results if there is positive entry along the balanced
2A new calibration is available at www.luttmer.org.
2growth path. A simple formula shows that this tail index will be close to 1 if ﬁrms with
high-quality blueprints grow at an equilibrium rate that is slightly below the sum of the
growth rate of the aggregate labor force and the hazard rate with which high-quality
ﬁrms lose their edge. Thus high-quality ﬁrms can grow fast if the period of rapid growth
is not expected to last too long. But there will be variation in how long ﬁrms are in
this rapid growth phase, and this variation allows for the appearance of young large
ﬁrms. This version of the organization capital interpretation of ﬁrm growth can match
the overall size distribution, the amount of entry and exit, as well as the relatively
young age of large ﬁrms. Furthermore, although Gibrat’s law does not hold, the mean
growth rates of surviving ﬁrms behave like they do in the data: roughly independent of
size for most ﬁrms and signiﬁcantly higher for the smallest ﬁrms (Dunne, Roberts and
Samuelson [1989]).



















































Fljxuh I Selected Growth Histories
Figure I presents some corroborating evidence for the type of histories of ﬁrm growth
predicted by the model. It shows the employment histories of 25 of the nearly 1,000 large
ﬁrms that had more than ten thousand employees in 2008 (the data are described in
A p p e n d i xA ) .T h ea v e r a g ee m p l o y m e n tg r o w t hr a t ea c r o s sa l lﬁr m sr e p o r t e di nF i g u r e
I is almost 18% per annum, and there is considerable variation. In particular, ﬁrm
growth rates seem to be much above average when ﬁrms are relatively small, and decline
signiﬁcantly when ﬁrms become large. The data shown in Figure I represent only a
3small sample from a population of slightly under a thousand large ﬁrms. In turn, this
population of large ﬁrms was selected over many years from the population of all ﬁrms
that were ever set up. In US data, the number of ﬁrms grows at an annual rate about
equal to the 1% growth rate of aggregate employment. Combined with an entry rate of
11%, a steady-state calculation implies that the number of ﬁrms that was ever set up
is roughly 11 times the current population of around 6 million ﬁrms.3 The thousand or
so ﬁrms with ten thousand or more employees are thus a highly selected sample from a
universe of about 66 million ﬁrms. In such a selected sample, one might conjecture, it
is not surprising to see that large ﬁrms tend to have a history of rapid enough growth
to match the age distribution, even though Gibrat’s law holds. The results presented in
this paper show that this conjecture is wrong when shocks tend to average out within a
ﬁrm. The strings of positive growth needed are too unlikely, and currently active large
ﬁrms should be about 750 years old if Gibrat’s law holds.
Related Literature This paper goes back to, interprets, and builds on the type of
growth process initially proposed by Yule [1925] and Simon [1955]. Yule [1925] was
concerned with the number of species in biological genera, and Simon [1955] with word
frequencies, city sizes and income distributions. In the context of cities, Krugman [1996,
p. 96] described the time it takes for cities to grow large in Simon’s model as an
unresolved problem. Simon and Bonini [1958], Ijiri and Simon [1964], and many others
since studied ﬁrm growth. Klette and Kortum [2004] describe an economy based on
the quality-ladder model of Grossman and Helpman [1991] in which ﬁrm size follows a
birth-death process, as in this paper. In their economy, incumbent ﬁrms cannot grow
on average because there is a ﬁxed set of commodities and new entrants continuously
capture the markets for some of those commodities. This makes it impossible for large
ﬁr m st oa r i s e .T h i sd i ﬃculty is resolved here by considering an economy in which the
number of commodities can grow over time, as in Romer [1990] and Young [1998]. Even
without growth in the number of markets, a thick-tailed size distribution can arise in the
Klette and Kortum [2004] economy if Gibrat’s law is relaxed along the lines described
in this paper.
The models in this paper are highly tractable analytically, and inevitably stylized.
Lentz and Mortensen [2006] use a version of the Klette and Kortum [2004] economy
3The growth rate of the collection of all historical ﬁrms equals the entry rate times the fraction of all
historical ﬁrms that are currently active. In a steady state, it also equals the growth rate of the active
number of ﬁrms, which equals the growth rate of aggregate employment.
4with additional and more ﬂexible sources of heterogeneity. They do not address the
thin-right-tail problem but estimate their model using panel data on Danish ﬁrms.4 The
Danish ﬁrm size data do not appear to exhibit the striking Pareto shape that is found
reliably in U.S. data. The small size of the Danish economy may well account for this–
there are as many ﬁrms in the U.S. as there are people in Denmark. When it comes
to examining the right tail of the size distribution, a model economy with a continuum
of ﬁrms could simply be a better abstraction for the U.S. than for a small country like
Denmark. In addition, small countries will have fewer very large ﬁrms if the replication
of blueprints across national boundaries or outside language areas comes at additional
costs.
Firms in this paper are organizations that operate in (monopolistically) competitive
markets and grow through continuous investment in new blueprints, at a level that is
proportional to the size of the ﬁrm. One can alternatively view a ﬁrm as a trading post or
network in which agents trade repeatedly. Gibrat’s law and the observed size distribution
arise if there is population growth and agents search for ﬁr m sb yr a n d o m l ys a m p l i n go t h e r
agents and matching with the ﬁrm with which the agent sampled is already matched.
A simple version of such a model is described in Luttmer [2006]. Related models of
network formation are presented in Jackson [2006] and Jackson and Rogers [2007], and
the extensive literature cited therein. Deciding on the relative importance of these
alternative interpretations poses diﬃcult identiﬁcation problems.
Outline The economy and its balanced growth path are described in Section 2, to-
gether with two alternative formulations of the role of blueprints in production. The
stationary size and age distributions are derived in Section 3 and formulas are given
for the tail index ζ in the Gibrat and non-Gibrat cases (Propositions 3 and 4), and for
the mode of the age distribution of large ﬁrms when both Gibrat’s and Zipf’s law hold
(Section 3.5). Calibrations are in Section 4. All proofs and a description of the data are
in the appendix.
2. Tkh Efrqrp|
Blueprints are costly to replicate or produce from scratch. In the baseline version of the
economy, a blueprint describes the idea for a particular ﬁnal good. No two blueprints
are the same, whether produced by replication or from scratch. Final goods producers
4See also Seker [2007] for related work on Chilean establishments.
5are monopolistic competitors. Time is continuous and indexed by t ∈ [0,∞).
2.1 Consumers
There is a growing population of consumers measured by Ht = Heηt at time t.T h e
dynastic preferences of the representative consumer over aggregate consumption ﬂows











The parameters η, ρ and γ are positive and γ =1is interpreted as logarithmic utility.
Markets are complete and consumers face standard budget constraints. The resulting
interest rate in consumption numeraire is related to the consumption growth rate via
















where Nt(ω) is the measure of type-ω commodities and σ > 1 is the elasticity of substi-
tution. In the baseline speciﬁcation, all commodity types are the same and all producers
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where Nt =
U







where Pt is the price index Pt = ptN
−1/(σ−1)
t . Note that the prices of diﬀerentiated
commodities and the composite good are quoted in some arbitrary numeraire. All other
prices will be expressed in units of the composite commodity.
2.2 Producers
Given a blueprint for a particular diﬀerentiated commodity, a producer can use l units of
labor to produce Ztl units of the commodity, where Zt = Zeθt evolves exogenously. The
marginal cost of one unit of a commodity is thus wt/Zt in units of composite good, and
6the constant elasticity demand curves (3) imply that producers set prices at a constant
markup over marginal cost, pt/Pt =( wt/Zt)/(1−1/σ). Combining this with (2) and (3)
determines the equilibrium real wage as a function of the state (Zt,N t),
wt =( 1− 1/σ)ZtN
1/(σ−1)
t . (4)
The amount of labor needed to satisfy the resulting demand for a typical commodity is





σ−1 (1 − 1/σ)Ct
wt
.( 5 )
The markup 1/(1 − 1/σ) of price over marginal cost implies that proﬁts measured in
units of the composite good will be wtlt/(σ − 1).
2.3 New Blueprints
The producer of a diﬀerentiated commodity needs a blueprint to produce. Blueprints
depreciate in a one-hoss-shay fashion at an average rate λt. New blueprints for distinct
diﬀerentiated commodities can be produced by using labor to replicate existing blue-
prints, or from scratch by entrepreneurs. The respective rates at which this occurs in
equilibrium are denoted by μt and νt. The number of new blueprints therefore evolves
according to
DNt =( νt + μt − λt)Nt. (6)
An initial condition determines N0.
2.3.1 Replication of Existing Blueprints
A new blueprint produced from an existing blueprint arrives following an exponentially
distributed waiting time with mean μt = f(it),w h e r eit is labor employed in the replica-
tion process. An existing blueprint is lost following an exponentially distributed waiting
time with mean λt = g(jt),w h e r ejt is labor used to “maintain” the blueprint. Note that
an existing blueprint generates revenues from its use in the production of a commodity,
and as an input in the production of new blueprints.5 The value qt of a blueprint must
5The model of how Wal-Mart has expanded since 1962 described in Holmes [2006] has this feature.
The key assumption here is that K-Mart cannot simultaneously look at a Wal-Mart blueprint to produce
a new blueprint of its own. As in Boldrin and Levine [1999, 2006], and unlike Luttmer [2007], spillovers
are assumed to be of secondary importance in this economy.
7satisfy the Bellman equation








− [i + j]

+( μ − λ)qt +D qt

,( 7 )
together with a transversality condition. The blueprint production function f is in-
creasing and exhibits strictly decreasing returns to scale. The blueprint depreciation
function g is assumed to be strictly decreasing and convex. For simplicity, both f and
g are assumed to suﬃciently smooth, with slopes that are unbounded near zero and
converge to zero for large i and j. The optimal levels of investment in new blueprints
and maintenance of existing blueprints are determined by
μt = f(it), λt = g(jt), qtDf(it)=−qtDg(jt)=wt.( 8 )
The technology assumptions ensure that μt and −λt are increasing in qt. Blueprints are
replicated more quickly and maintained better when their value is high.
2.3.2 New Designs by Entrepreneurs
New blueprints can also be designed from scratch by agents acting as entrepreneurs,
without the input of an existing blueprint. At any point in time, every agent in the
economy is endowed with one unit of eﬀort that can be allocated to two tasks: supplying
labor or attempting to produce a blueprint. Every agent has a skill vector (x,y),w h e r e
x i st h er a t ea tw h i c ht h ea g e n tc a nd e v e l o pn e wb l u e p r i n t sa n dy is the amount of labor
the agent can supply per unit of time. Comparative advantage determines occupational
choice. Ignoring ties, agents with skill vectors that satisfy qtx>w ty will choose to be
entrepreneurs who design blueprints, and agents with skill vectors that satisfy qtx<w ty
will choose to be employees.
There is a time-invariant talent distribution T deﬁned over the set of all possible skill
vectors, as in the Roy model of Rosen [1978]. This talent distribution has a ﬁnite mean.
For simplicity, it is assumed to have a density so that ties play no role. The resulting









respectively. Clearly, the supply of entrepreneurial eﬀort is increasing in qt/wt,a n d
the supply of labor is decreasing, both ranging between 0 and the mean skill in the
8population. If the talent distribution is Fréchet then the elasticity of E(qt/wt)/L(qt/wt)
with respect to qt/wt is constant (Luttmer [2008]).
2.4 Equilibrium
Given a per-capita supply of entrepreneurial eﬀort E(qt/wt) and a stock of blueprints
Nt,t h er a t eνt at which new blueprints are added by entrepreneurs is determined by
νtNt = HtE(qt/wt). (11)
Labor market clearing requires that
(lt + it + jt)Nt = HtL(qt/wt). (12)
The equilibrium is determined by (1)-(12), an initial condition for N0, and a transver-
sality condition for qtNt.
Because the product market distortion arising from monopolistic competition is the
same in all markets and at all times, and because agents supply their time inelastically, it
turns out that the equilibrium allocation is Pareto eﬃcient. It is possible to characterize
the equilibrium dynamics in terms of only one state and one costate variable, and use
a phase diagram to construct an equilibrium that converges over time to a balanced
growth path.6
2.5 Balanced Growth
A key feature of the balanced growth path is that the allocation of labor per blueprint is
constant at some (i,j,l). Population growth then implies that the measure of blueprints
is given by Nt = Neηt for some N. Because of (4) and (5), wages and per-capita
consumption grow at the rate κ = θ + η/(σ − 1).T h et e r m η/(σ − 1) measures gains
from variety, as in Young [1998]. By (1), the implied interest rate is r = ρ+γκ.T h eﬂow
proﬁts from producing a commodity is wtl/(σ − 1). It follows that [qt,w t]=[ q,w]eκt.






σ−1 − (i + j)
r − κ − (μ − λ)
, (13)
6The rate at which blueprint capital is accumulated in this economy depends intricately on the
shape of the production and depreciation functions f and g, and the shape of the talent distribution.
Adjustment to the balanced growth path may be slow and asymmetric. A detailed analysis is beyond
the scope of this paper.
9where (i,j) and (μ,λ) satisfy
μ = f(i), λ = g(j), (q/w)Df(i)=−(q/w)Dg(j)=1 .( 1 4 )
Holding ﬁxed l, these conditions imply that q/w is equal to the maximum subject to
[μ,λ]=[ f(i),g(j)] o ft h er i g h t - h a n ds i d eo f( 1 3 ) ,a sl o n ga st h i si sﬁnite.7 The fact
that the aggregate number of blueprints grows at the rate η implies that new blueprints
must be added by entrepreneurs at the rate ν = η − (μ − λ).I f E(q/w) is positive,






η − (μ − λ)
. (15)
Alternatively, E(q/w)=0and η = μ − λ. Along a balanced growth path, the labor-





i + j + l
.( 1 6 )
The balanced growth conditions (13)-(16) determine (i,j,l), (μ,λ), q/w,a n dN/H.T h e
level of wages follows from (4) and aggregate consumption can be obtained from (5),
wages, and l.
Given a positive q/w that is not too large, the conditions (13)-(14) can be solved for
the labor allocation (i,j,l) and the resulting blueprint creation and destruction rates μ
and λ.I t i s n o t d i ﬃcult to verify that (i,j,l) and μ − λ are increasing in q/w.S i n c e
E(q/w) is increasing in q/w, this implies a steady-state supply of blueprints (15) that is
increasing in q/w.S i n c eL(q/w) is decreasing in q/w, the derived demand for blueprints
(16) is decreasing in q/w. There can therefore be at most one price q/w that clears the
market for blueprints in steady state.
The replication technology must be assumed to satisfy f(0)−g(0) < η or else η ≥ μ−λ
cannot hold. The assumption r−κ > η ensures that η ≥ μ−λ implies r−κ > μ−λ.T h e
fact that E(q/w) and L(q/w) go to zero as q/w goes to, respectively, zero and inﬁnity, can
now be used to argue that (13)-(16) does in fact have a solution. It remains to show that
the decision problem of blueprint owners is well deﬁned. This follows because blueprint
owners cannot obtain unbounded proﬁts by replicating more quickly than r−κ.T h ef a c t
that f(i)−g(j) is increasing and concave implies that, at the proposed equilibrium, the
7That is, if and only if l is low enough to ensure that maxi,j{f(i) − g(j):i + j ≤ l/(σ − 1)} does
not exceed r − κ. The value of a blueprint is inﬁnite for l outside this range.
10ﬂow cost of doing so would exceed the ﬂow revenues wl/(σ−1) per blueprint. Together,
these results establish the following proposition.
Pursrvlwlrq 1 Suppose that ρ + γκ > κ + η and η >f (0) − g(0). Suppose that the
talent distribution is such that E(q/w) > 0 for all strictly positive q/w. Then (13)-(16)
deﬁnes the unique balanced growth path, and η > μ − λ.
A balanced growth path with E(q/w)=0can arise if the talent distribution has bounded
support. In such an equilibrium, new blueprints are only produced using replication from
an initial stock of blueprints.
2.6 Alternative Blueprint Interpretations
In the setup considered so far, diﬀerent blueprints specify distinct diﬀerentiated com-
modities that are produced subject to constant returns and are sold to all consumers.
The equilibrium conditions for this economy also apply to an economy in which con-
sumers live in many diﬀerent locations and blueprints are location speciﬁc. With minor
modiﬁcations, the same framework can be used as well to consider competitive ﬁnal
goods markets and blueprints containing the speciﬁcations for production facilities or
plants that are subject to decreasing returns. The following discussion elaborates on
these two interpretations. They are benchmarks. Hybrid formulations are more plausi-
ble, but also less analytically tractable.
2.6.1 Sales Oﬃces or Stores
Suppose that at any point in time, consumers are evenly distributed across many loca-
tions. In each location, there are many consumers who can only buy from local stores.
Preferences are as in (2), with Nt now denoting the measure of stores in a particular
location. An entrepreneur can create a blueprint for a store in a randomly selected lo-
cation. The store sells a new diﬀerentiated product. The blueprint can then be copied
to operate stores selling the same diﬀerentiated product in randomly selected new loca-
tions. There is an economy-wide market for labor services, or, equivalently, output is
produced where workers live and can be shipped to stores at no cost.
Because there are many locations, replicated blueprints are always assigned to new
locations, and every new store sells a commodity that is new to the market in which it
is introduced. Assuming there is a very large number of blueprints that can be copied,
every location receives a constant ﬂow of new stores, and stores are uniformly distributed
11across locations. As a result, new stores face the same market conditions everywhere.8
With this, the analysis proceeds as before.
2.6.2 Jobs, Production Lines, Plants
Instead of assuming that the output of every producer is unique, suppose there is one
competitive market for ﬁnal goods. A blueprint deﬁnes a particular job, production
line or plant that is subject to decreasing returns to scale. Each plant can use lt units
of labor to produce output ZtF(1,l t) for some constant returns to scale production
function F. Growth in variety is no longer a source of consumption growth. Along a
balanced growth path, wages grow at the same rate as Zt, the amount of labor used per
blueprint is constant, and the number of blueprints grows at the population growth rate
η. In contrast to the Dixit-Stiglitz formulation used elsewhere in this paper, no constant
elasticity assumptions are needed. The production function F is general, even though Zt
is not labor-augmenting in the usual sense. In units of blueprints, the per-capita capital
stock is constant. But the market value of the capital stock and the cost of producing
new capital grows at the same rate as Zt,w a g e s ,a n do u t p u tp e rc a p i t a .
3. Tkh Dlvwulexwlrq ri Flup Sl}h dqg Ajh
The economy described up to now has agents who consume, supply labor, and act as
entrepreneurs. Everyone can own blueprints and there are no ﬁrms. A transaction cost
argument can be used to motivate a deﬁnition of what ﬁrms are in this economy.
Consider an entrepreneur who has just developed a new blueprint. To hire labor to
produce the associated commodity and develop further copies of the same blueprint, the
entrepreneur can set up a ﬁrm at no cost. This deﬁnes a ﬁrm entry. Claims to ﬁrms
can be traded freely. But there is a cost, potentially very small, involved in ﬁrms hiring
entrepreneurs to develop new blueprints from scratch, in selling blueprints to ﬁrms, and
in merging ﬁrms. There are no cost advantages to any of these transactions, and so they
8There must be many more stores than locations. Imagine markets are non-overlapping intervals of
length 1/A in [0,1],w h e r eA ∈ N. Each one of the A markets has τA consumers and there are σA2 stores
that are randomly assigned to points in [0,1].T h er a t i oo fs t o r e st oc o n s u m e r si sσ/τ.A sA becomes
large, the proportion of all stores assigned to the region [0,x] converges to x. If the number of stores
were σA instead, then the number of stores in diﬀerent markets would remain random and converge
to a Poisson distribution. Market conditions would vary across locations, and strategic considerations
would come into play in each market.
12will not occur in equilibrium.9 A ﬁrm will therefore only gain new blueprints through
“organic growth,” by replicating its existing blueprints. A ﬁrm only loses blueprints as
they depreciate at the rate λ.10 Exit occurs when a ﬁrm has lost all its blueprints.
The measure of ﬁrms with n blueprints at time t is denoted by Mn,t. The aggregate





Over time, the change in the number of ﬁrms with one blueprint is
DM1,t = λ2M2,t + νNt − (μ + λ)M1,t, (18)
where μ, λ,a n dν = η − (μ − λ) are equilibrium rates that are constant along the
balanced growth path. The number of ﬁrms with one blueprint increases because ﬁrms
with two blueprints lose one, or because of entry. The number declines because ﬁrms
with one blueprint gain or lose a blueprint. Similarly, the numbers of ﬁrms with more
than one blueprint evolve according to
DMn,t = μ(n − 1)Mn−1,t + λ(n +1 ) Mn+1,t − (μ + λ)nMn,t, (19)
for all n−1 ∈ N.T h ej o i n td y n a m i c so fNt and {Mn,t}∞
n=1 is fully described by (17)-(19).
3.1 The Stationary Size Distribution
Along the balanced growth path, Nt grows at the rate η and a stationary ﬁrm size
distribution exists if (17)-(19) has a solution that satisﬁes DMn,t = ηMn,t for all n ∈ N.




for all n ∈ N. T h i si st h ef r a c t i o no fﬁrms with n blueprints. It is analytically more




9Of course these transactions do occur in the data. This is a familiar and important failure of the
type of model described in this paper. Chatterjee and Rossi-Hansberg [2006] provide an interesting
model of ﬁrm size in which adverse selection makes it diﬃcult for ﬁrms to hire entrepreneurs.
10Bernard, Redding and Schott [2006] document the importance of turnover in the mix of products
sold by U.S. manufacturing ﬁrms. They report that less than 1% of product adds and drops are
associated with mergers or acquisitions.
13for all n ∈ N.W i t ht h e s ed e ﬁnitions, (18) becomes




ηQn = μQn−1 + λQn+1 − (μ + λ)Qn, (21)
for n − 1 ∈ N. Note that these equations only depend on the parameters μ/η and λ/η.
The stationary distribution cannot depend on the units in which time is measured.
Pursrvlwlrq 2 Suppose that η, μ, λ,a n dν = η − (μ − λ) are positive. Deﬁne the
sequence {βn}∞
n=0 by the recursion βn =1 /(1−(μβn−1/λ)+(η+μn)/λn) and the initial
condition β0 =0 . This sequence is monotone and converges to min{1,λ/μ}.T h eo n l y



























Here, (23) means that the ratio of the left- and right-hand sides converges to 1 as n
becomes large. If ν =0then the only non-negative and summable solution to (20)-(21) is
identically zero, implying that there does not exist a stationary distribution in this case.
If ν > 0, then (22) adds up to 1 by construction and deﬁnes a stationary size distribution
{Pn}∞
n=1 via Qn ∝ Pn/n.T h e m e a n ﬁrm size can be written as 1/(
S∞
n=1 Qn/n),a n d
this is also ﬁnite by construction. Appendix B proves these results and gives an explicit
solution for Qn in the more general case that arises when the size distribution of entrants
is non-degenerate.
When λ > μ, the properties of the right-hand side of (23) are very diﬀerent from
what they are when μ > λ.I f λ > μ,t h e nQn is bounded above by a multiple of the
geometrically declining sequence (μ/λ)n. On the other hand, if μ > λ then μβn/λ ↑ 1,
and hence the right-hand side of (23) declines at a rate that is slower than any given
geometric rate. The following proposition gives a further characterization of the right
tail of the distribution.
14Pursrvlwlrq 3 Suppose that η > μ − λ > 0. Then the right tail probabilities Rn =
S∞









where ζ = η/(μ − λ).T h a ti s ,Rn is a regularly varying sequence with index −ζ.
This means that limn→∞ R[xn]/Rn = x−ζ for any x>0. An implication is that nθRn → 0
for all θ < ζ and nθRn →∞for all θ > ζ. Even though this does not describe precisely
what happens to nζRn for large n,t h ep a r a m e t e rζ will continue to be referred to as
the tail index of the size distribution.11 The limiting tail index ζ =1associated with
Zipf’s law arises when the rate ν = η − (μ − λ) at which blueprints are introduced
by entrepreneurs converges to zero. Appendix B shows that Proposition 3 holds more
generally if the size distribution of entrants has a right tail that is regularly varying with
an index smaller than −ζ.
For comparison, consider the economy of Klette and Kortum [2004]. There, η =0and
μ < λ. This turns (20)-(21) into a linear diﬀerence equation with constant coeﬃcients
that is easy to solve. The resulting ﬁrm size distribution is R.A. Fisher’s logarithmic se-
ries distribution, which has Pn ∝ (μ/λ)
n /n. As a result, right tail probabilities converge
to zero even more quickly than a geometric sequence. To generate a thick right tail,
ﬁrms must grow on average, and in the economy described here this requires population
growth. A tail index ζ close to 1 can only arise if growth in the number of blueprints
is mostly due to incumbents rather than new entrants. It is critical that ﬁrms grow
exponentially. If ﬁrms accumulate new blueprints at some constant rate μ,i n s t e a do f
μn, then the size distribution would be Poisson-like, with a geometrically bounded right
tail.
3.2 Firm Entry and Exit Rates
The ﬂow of blueprints introduced by new ﬁrms is νNt.E a c hn e wﬁrm starts with one
blueprint, and so νNt is also the ﬂow of new ﬁr m st h a te n t e r sp e ru n i to ft i m e .T h eﬁrm
entry rate as a fraction of the number of incumbent ﬁrms, denoted by ε, is therefore equal
to νNt divided by the number of ﬁrms in the economy,
S∞
n=1 Mn,t = Nt/
S∞
n=1 nPn.A n
alternative way to calculate the ﬁrm entry rate ε is to note that the only ﬁrms that can
11See Bojanic and Seneta [1973] for the deﬁnition of regularly varying sequences and some of its
implications. Bingham, Goldie and Teugels [1987] is a useful source on the general topic of regular
variation.
15exit in this economy are ﬁrms with one remaining blueprint. The proportion of such
ﬁrms is P1, and they exit at a rate λ. The resulting balance ε − λP1 of ﬁrms entering
a n de x i t i n gp e ru n i to ft i m em u s te q u a lt h er a t eη at which the number of ﬁrms grows




nPn = η + λP1. (24)
Just like the blueprint entry rate ν + μ = η + λ ≥ η,t h eﬁrm entry rate can be no
less than the population growth rate, and this lower bound is attained only when ﬁrms
never lose blueprints and therefore never exit. The two equations given in (24) and
Q1 = P1/
S∞
n=1 nPn imply ε/η = ν/(ν−λQ1). Together with (22) this yields an explicit
formula for the ﬁrm entry rate relative to the population growth rate. In turn this
implies an explicit formula for the mean ﬁrm size ε/ν.
3.3 Firm Type Transitions
The data shown in Figure I suggest that some ﬁrms initially grow at rates that far
exceed the bound μ − λ < η implied by Proposition 1, and that these growth rates
decline with ﬁrm size and age. A simple way to account for this slow-down and examine
its implications for the stationary size distribution is as follows. Suppose there are
high- and low-quality blueprints. High-quality blueprints imply a productivity ZHeθt
and low quality blueprints imply a productivity ZLeθt,w h e r eZH >Z L. Entrepreneurs
produce high-quality blueprints with probability α ∈ (0,1] and low-quality blueprints
with probability 1 − α.12 Incumbent ﬁrms replicate blueprints as before, preserving
their quality. But high-quality ﬁrms transition to become low-quality ﬁrms following
independent and exponentially distributed waiting times with a mean 1/δH.W h e n
such a transition happens, all blueprints of the ﬁrm turn into low-quality blueprints,
permanently. Any new blueprints created by the ﬁrm thereafter will be of low quality.
Low-quality ﬁrms can also exit randomly at a rate δL, irrespective of the number of
blueprints that make up the ﬁrm.
One possible interpretation for these kinds of ﬁrm type transitions is that some
aspect of the environment for which the initial blueprint of a ﬁrm was created changes
permanently. Outside the formal model described here, a relative decline in the quality
of a ﬁrm’s blueprints could arise from competing ﬁrms catching up. An alternative
12Alternatively, one can assume that entrepreneurs have potentially diﬀerent skills for producing high-
and low-quality blueprints. Relative prices and comparative advantage then determine the quality mix
of start-up blueprints.
16interpretation for the decline in ﬁrm growth rates is that blueprints are location-speciﬁc
and that ﬁrms initially implement blueprints in the most proﬁtable locations.
Along a balanced growth path, the present-value condition (13) must be modiﬁed
to account for the loss in value that occurs when a blueprint transitions from one type
to another. The incentives to replicate and maintain continue to be determined by
(14). Let q = αqH +( 1− α)qL,w h e r eqH and qL are the respective prices of high- and
low-quality blueprints. The steady-state number of high-quality blueprints is NH/H =
αE(q/w)/(η+δH−[μH−λH]). Low-quality blueprints are produced by entrepreneurs, by
incumbent replication, and because a ﬂow of high-quality blueprints depreciate in quality.
This implies NL/H =[ ( 1− α)E(q/w)+δHNH/H]/(η + δL − [μL − λL]).W r i t e(iI,j I,l I)
for the allocation of labor to a type-I blueprint. As long as the talent distribution for




(1 − α)(iL + jL + lL)
η + δL − (μL − λL)
+
α
η + δH − (μH − λH)

iH + jH + lH +
δH(iL + jL + lL)
η + δL − (μL − λL)

.
As in the case of (15)-(16), labor market clearing forces η +δH > μH −λH and η +δL >
μL − λL in any equilibrium in which entrepreneurs contribute to the supply of new
blueprints.
One can verify that ZH >Z L implies iH >i L, jH >j L,l H >l L and qH >q L. While
their quality advantage lasts, high-quality ﬁr m sh a v es t r o n g e ri n c e n t i v e st or e p l i c a t ea n d
maintain blueprints than low-quality ﬁrms. High-quality ﬁrms choose to grow faster than
low-quality ﬁrms. This can account for the thick tail of the size distribution.
Pursrvlwlrq 4 Suppose some ﬁrms enter as high-quality ﬁrms and transition to low-
quality ﬁrms at a positive rate δH. Low-quality ﬁr m sa l s oe x i tr a n d o m l ya tar a t eδL.
Then, along the balanced growth path, μH − λH > μL − λL, η + δH > μH − λH and
η + δL > μL − λL. The stationary size distribution has a tail index ζ given by







The right tail of the size distribution declines geometrically if this is inﬁnite.
The actual size distribution and a proof of Proposition 4 are implied by the results in
Appendix B. If ζ =( η+δH)/(μH−λH),t h e nl a r g eﬁrms arise because of the rapid growth
of new ﬁrms. This can generate a thick tail even if there is no population growth.
173.4 Firm Age and Size
The age distribution among large ﬁrms is a useful tool for assessing alternative interpre-
tations of the ﬁrm size distribution. This age distribution can be constructed from the
size distributions of cohorts of ﬁr m st h a ta r et h es a m ea g e .
3.4.1 The Size Distribution of a Cohort
Consider a cohort of ﬁrms initially with k ∈ N blueprints and in a common growth
phase. While in this initial growth phase, ﬁrms of size n ∈ N gain blueprints at the rate
μn and lose blueprints at the rate λn. Firms in this cohort also transition randomly into
an e wg r o w t hp h a s ea tar a t eδ.L e tT−1,k(a) denote the fraction of ﬁrms in the cohort
that have made this transition by age a.D e ﬁne Tn,k(a) to be fraction of ﬁrms that have
n ∈ N blueprints at age a and have not made the transition. Let T0,k(a) represent the
ﬁrms in the cohort that have exited as a result of losing their last blueprint. Only ﬁrms
that have not yet exited can transition into a new growth phase,
DT−1,k(a)=δ[1 − T−1,k(a) − T0,k(a)]. (25)
Exit occurs when a ﬁrm loses its last blueprint, and hence
DT0,k(a)=λT1,k(a). (26)
The number of ﬁrms with n blueprints and still in the original growth phase by age a
must satisfy
DTn,k(a)=μ(n − 1)Tn−1,k(a)+λ(n +1 ) Tn+1,k(a) − [δ +( μ + λ)n]Tn,k(a) (27)
for all n ∈ N.N o t et h a tt h e−δTn,k(a) term is not scaled by n,r e ﬂecting the assumption
that the transition to a new growth phase is independent of size.
Pursrvlwlrq 5 For any μ > 0 and λ ≥ 0 deﬁne γ(a)=( e(μ−λ)a − 1)/(e(μ−λ)a − λ/μ).























































for all n ∈ N.
For δ =0and k =1this solution can be found in Klette and Kortum [2004]. The
probability generating function for δ =0and k ∈ N is in Kendall [1948]. Using the
fact that γ(a) goes to zero as age goes to zero one can verify that Tk,k(a) ↑ 1 as age
goes to zero. The solution for T0,k(a) follows directly from T1,k(a) and integrating (26).
Summing Tn,k(a) over all n ∈ N gives 1−T−1,k(0)−T0,k(0) = e−δa(1−[γ(b)λ/μ]k) and then
T−1,k(0) follows from integrating (25). The proof of Proposition 5 can be completed by
computing the derivative of Tn,k(a) and checking (27) for any n ∈ N.A p p e n d i xCg i v e s
a more constructive proof based on the observation that, conditional on no transition,
a ﬁrm with n blueprints gains and loses blueprints with the same probabilities as does
t h ea g g r e g a t eo fn independent ﬁrms with one blueprint each.
If δ =0 ,t h e nT0,k(a) → min{1,λ/μ} as the age of a cohort grows without bound.
If μ < λ then virtually all of a cohort of ﬁrms will have exited the economy after a
suﬃciently long time. On the other hand, if μ > λ then a fraction 1−λ/μ of any cohort
of ﬁrms survives and grows forever, giving rise to a thick-tailed size distribution.
3.4.2 Age Given Size
Now consider the setup of Proposition 4, with a fraction α of a cohort of new ﬁrms
entering with high-quality blueprints. Write TH,n,k(a) and TL,n,k(a) for the solutions to
(25)-(27) associated with the parameters (μH,λH,δH) and (μL,λL,δL), respectively. Let
n = −1 now represent the absorbing state low-quality ﬁrms enter into at a rate δL.T h e n
the cohort size distribution {pn(a)}∞














for all n +1∈ N.F o rn = −1 the term αTH,n,1(a) drops out since high-quality ﬁrms do
not transition directly into the state n = −1.T h ei n ﬁnite sum on the right-hand side of
(28) can be calculated explicitly, as reported in Appendix C. The ﬁrst two terms on the
right-hand side of (28) account for the ﬁrms that are still in their original growth phase.
A ﬂow δHTH,k,1(a − b) of high-quality ﬁrms with k blueprints transition to become low-
quality ﬁrms at age a−b. Adding up over all sizes and ages and accounting for subsequent
19ﬁrm growth gives the third term. Note well that only a fraction 1 − p−1(a) − p0(a) of
the cohort survives until age a as active ﬁrms.
Along a balanced growth path, the measure of entering ﬁrms is growing at a rate η.
Consider the population of all ﬁr m st h a th a v ee v e re n t e r e du pt oap a r t i c u l a rp o i n ti n
time, including those that have since exited. The exponential rate η at which the size of
entering cohorts grows implies that this population has an exponential age distribution
with density ηe−ηa. Because {pn(a)}∞
n=−1 includes ﬁr m st h a th a v ee x i t e d ,t h ej o i n t
density of age and size is ηe−ηapn(a) among all ﬁr m st h a th a v ee v e re n t e r e d . T h ea g e
density among all ﬁr m so fs i z ea tl e a s tn is therefore
hn(a)=
e−ηa S∞




In particular, for n =1this deﬁnes the age density among all surviving ﬁrms.
3.5 Gibrat and Zipf–A Convenient Special Case
Consider again the economy in which all ﬁrms have the same growth parameters μ and
λ. Suppose η and λ are bounded away from zero and let μ−λ approach η from below so
that the rate ν at which blueprints are introduced by entrepreneurs goes to zero. This
is exactly when the tail index ζ = η/(μ − λ) approaches 1 from above. In this limit,
the recursion (21) for Qn ∝ nPn can be written as Pn = λ






Xn for all n − 1 ∈ N.T h i si m p l i e sXn+1 =2 X2/[n(n +1 ) ]for all n ∈ N.































by the dominated convergence theorem. Thus the right-tail probabilities satisfy Zipf’s
law–they behave like 1/n.
This limiting distribution does not have a ﬁnite mean. At the same time as the rate
ν at which blueprints are introduced by entrepreneurs goes to zero, the average number
of blueprints per ﬁrm ε/ν grows without bound. The entry rate of new ﬁrms satisﬁes








In situations where most blueprints are created by incumbent ﬁrms, this allows one to
infer μ and λ simply from the population growth rate η and the ﬁrm entry rate ε.A
comparison of (30) and (31) shows that ε/η ≈ nRn for large n.T h e h i g h e r t h e e n t r y
rate, the more ﬁrms there will be in the right tail. If Rn is measured by the fraction of
all ﬁrms with more than a certain large number of employees, then (ε/η)/Rn provides
an estimate of the associated number of blueprints n, and this then implies an estimate
for the number of employees assigned to each blueprint.
Given only one growth phase, the expression (29) for the density of age given a size
of at least n reduces to hn(a) ∝ e−ηa S∞
k=n Tk,1(a)=e−ηa[1 − (λ/μ)γ(a)]γn−1(a),w h e r e
γ(a) is given in Proposition 5. This simpliﬁes further for the Zipf limit η = μ − λ,a n d








for all n ∈ N. The Zipf asymptote of the Yule process corresponds to η = μ and λ =0 ,
which yields amode =l n ( n)/η. This is just the time it takes to reach size n for a ﬁrm
that grows deterministically at a rate η. Formula (32) shows that the modal age of large
ﬁrms converges to zero as μ/η increases without bound. But then (31) implies the ﬁrm
entry also grows without bound. This will be the tension that makes it hard to hold on
to Gibrat’s law.
4. U.S. Epsor|hu Flupv
U.S. Internal Revenue Service statistics contain more than 26 million corporations, part-
nerships and non-farm proprietorships. Business statistics collected by the U.S. Census
consist of both non-employer ﬁrms and employer ﬁrms. In 2002 there were more than
17 million non-employer ﬁrms, many with very small receipts, and close to 6 million
employer ﬁrms.
Here, Census data on employer ﬁrms assembled by the U.S. Small Business Adminis-
tration (SBA) will be considered. For employer ﬁrms, part-time employees are included
in employee counts, as are executives. But proprietors and partners of unincorporated
businesses are not (Armington [1998, p. 9]). This is likely to create signiﬁcant distor-
tions in measured employment for small ﬁrms. The SBA reports ﬁrm counts for 24 size
21categories, ranging from 1 to 4 employees to 10,000 and more employees, as well as the
number of employer ﬁr m st h a th a v en oe m p l o y m e n ti nM a r c hb u ts o m ee m p l o y m e n t
at other times during the year. Over the period 1989-2006, SBA data show that the
number of ﬁrms grows roughly at the population growth rate of about 1% per annum,
in line with the theory presented here and in Luttmer [2007].
Newly collected data on the age of ﬁrms with more than 10,000 employees in 2008
will also be used. Two measures of ﬁrm age are reported. One is based on the date
a ﬁrm was incorporated. Corporate restructuring can cause this measure of age to
be much below the age of the underlying organization that constitutes the ﬁrm. An
alternative measure uses the earliest date a ﬁrm or any of its components are known to
have been in operation. A more detailed description of how this data was collected is
given in Appendix A. Clearly, the complicated genealogy of many large corporations is
not captured by the models described in this paper.
4.1 Gibrat Implies 750 Year Old Firms
Panels (i) and (ii) of Figure II show the ﬁtted employment size distribution assuming
there is only one growth phase. The fractions #{ﬁrms with employment ≤ x}/#{all
ﬁrms} and #{ﬁrms with employment ≥ x}/#{all ﬁrms} observed in the data are dis-
played after merging the category of employer ﬁrms with no employment in March with
the category of 1 to 4 employees. The right tail of the size distribution, shown in panel
(ii), is clearly well approximated by x−ζ, and the slope of the log tail probabilities with
respect to x is about ζ ≈ 1.05. Note that this estimate does not depend on the units
in which ﬁrm size is measured. The formula for the tail index ζ combined with a 1%
population growth rate implies that incumbent ﬁrms grow at a rate μ−λ = η/ζ ≈ .95%
per annum.
To decompose μ − λ,c o n s i d e rﬁrst the Yule process obtained by setting λ =0
and μ = .0095. The only remaining free parameter is then the number of employees per
blueprint i+j+l. To see how this parameter can be identiﬁed, write   = i+j+l and recall
that Rn is the fraction of ﬁrms with n or more blueprints. The fraction of ﬁrms with at
least x ∈ { n : n ∈ N} employees is then Rx/ . The vertical axis of panel (ii) of Figure II
shows ln(Rx/ ) and the horizontal axis shows ln(x)=l n (  )+ln(x/ ).T h u sa ni n c r e a s ei n
employment per blueprint moves the model prediction [ln(x),ln(Rx/ )] to the right by the
change in ln( ), for every ln(Rx/ ). Since the empirical counterparts to [ln(x),ln(Rx/ )]
are pretty much on a straight line for all ﬁrms with more than 10 employees, the choice
of   will simultaneously either ﬁto rf a i lt oﬁt all right tail probabilities for ﬁrms with
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































24by setting i+j +l =2 .P a n e l( i )s h o w st h a tt h el e f tt a i li sa l s ow e l la p p r o x i m a t e d .T h e
stationary size distribution of a Yule process ﬁts the empirical size distribution quite
well. But a Yule process predicts no exit and a ﬁrm entry rate equal to ε = η,o ra b o u t
1% per annum. Instead, the SBA reports a ﬁrm entry rate of about 11% per annum
over the period 1989-2006. Actual ﬁrms do decline and exit, and entry rates are much
higher than the population growth rate.
To match the evidence on ﬁrm entry, consider ﬁrst the ζ ↓ 1 approximation. Given
η = .01and ε = .11,s o l v i n g( 3 1 )f o rμ and λ = μ − η gives μ = .4216 and λ =
.4116. In 2008, close to 1,000 ﬁrms out of a total of 6 million employer ﬁrms had at
least 10,000 employees. The combination of (30) and (31) therefore gives i + j + l ≈
10,000×Rn/(ε/η) ≈ 10×(1/6)/(.11/.01) = .15. The more precise estimates obtained for
ζ =1 .05 are very similar. Increasing μ and λ subject to the constraint μ − λ = η/ζ ≈
.0095 until the implied entry rate ε reaches the .11 v a l u eo b s e r v e di nt h ed a t ay i e l d s
μ = .4095 and λ = .4000. Choosing the number of employees per blueprint to match
the right tail probabilities now implies i+j +l = .20. The associated left and right tails
are shown in panels (i) and (ii) of Figure II. The increased transition probabilities μ and
λ raise the variance (μ + λ)/n of the growth rate of a ﬁrm with n blueprints, and this
implies that surviving ﬁrms are more likely to have many blueprints. Fitting the right
tail of the employment distribution therefore requires fewer employees per blueprint than
in the case of a Yule process. But then the left tail of the size distribution no longer
ﬁts well. The higher variance cuts down, too much, on the number of small ﬁrms–they
either exit or grow large.
The age distributions displayed in the upper panel of Figure III show a much more
dramatic failure of the one-phase model of ﬁrm growth. At μ = .4095, λ = .4000 and i+
j+l = .20,t h em e d i a na g eo fﬁrms with more than 10,000 employees is about 750 years.
The Yule process ﬁtted above implies a median large ﬁrm that is a couple of centuries
older still. In the data, the median age of these large ﬁr m si so n l ya b o u t7 5y e a r s .G i v e n
Gibrat’s law, all ﬁrms grow at the same average rate μ − λ, and this cannot exceed η,
or about 1% per year. Deterministic growth would imply that it takes ln(50,000)/.01 ≈
1,082 years to reach the size of 10,000 employees. The ζ ↓ 1 approximation (31) for the
entry rate gives μ/η ≈ 42.16 and then the approximation (32) for the mode of the age
distribution of large ﬁrms gives amode =1 0 0×ln(1+49,999/42.16) ≈ 708 years. Adding
variability lowers the age of the typical large ﬁrm, but the amount of variability that
can be added is constrained by the entry and exit evidence.
SBA data for the period 1989-2006 show that the annual exit rate of ﬁrms with 500
25or more employees is about 2.5%. As calibrated so far, the model implies this number
should be essentially zero. The annual growth rate of a ﬁrm with 500 employees has
a standard deviation of only
s
(.4095 + .4000)/2500 ≈ .018 and ﬁrms only exit after
losing all blueprints. To account for the observed exit of large ﬁrms, suppose a ﬁrm may
not only exit after losing its last blueprint, but also randomly at a rate δ = .02.T h e
approximation ζ ↓ 1 then implies that surviving ﬁrms grow at a rate μ−λ = η+δ of about
3% per year. The entry approximation (31) obtained by replacing η with η + δ yields
μ/(η+δ) ≈ 9.1, and hence μ ≈ .2730 and λ ≈ .2430. With a tail index ζ =1 .05 instead of
ζ =1 ,t h i sb e c o m e sμ = .2700 and λ = .2415. Given that random exit now accounts for
2% of the 10% exit rate, randomness at the blueprint level must be lower than before.
As a result, there will be more small ﬁrms, and adjusting the number of employees
per blueprint to match the right tail of the size distribution now gives i + j + l ≈ .6.
Thus a ﬁrm with 10,000 employees has about 16,667 blueprints, and the approximation
(32) then implies amode =l n ( 1+1 6 ,666/9.16)/.03 ≈ 250, a drastic improvement over
the calibration without random exit. The entire age distribution is shown in Figure
III. Deterministic growth conditional on survival would give ln(50,000)/.03 ≈ 361 or
ln(16,667)/.03 ≈ 324, and so much of the reduction in age is simply due to the fact
that survivors can now grow at a 3% annual rate instead of a 1% annual rate. But this
calibration still predicts that the median US ﬁrm is older than the US itself.
4.2 Rapid Initial Growth
As Figure I suggests, many large ﬁrms became large during relatively short periods of
growth at rates far exceeding the sum of the population growth rate and the exit rate
of large ﬁr m s .T h i sc a na c c o u n tf o rt h ef a c tt h a tt h em e d i a nl a r g eﬁrm is only 75 years
old. Proposition 4 indicates how this can also be made consistent with the observed
right tail of the size distribution. Firms can grow initially at a high rate μH − λH and
then transition at a rate δH to a regime with a growth rate μL − λL that must be
below η + δL. If the tail index is determined by the eﬀects of initial rapid growth, then
ζ =( η +δH)/(μH −λH).G i v e nζ ≈ 1.05 and η ≈ .01, this implies that μH −λH must be
close to δH. An initial phase with very rapid growth is possible as long as this phase is
of suﬃciently short average duration. The realized durations of the high-growth regime
are exponentially distributed, implying that some ﬁrms grow rapidly for much longer
than the average duration. This results in relatively young large ﬁrms.
Allowing for an initial growth phase adds the parameters α, μH, λH, δH and iH +
jH + lH. This gives more than enough ﬂexibility to match the observed median age of
26large ﬁrms. The theory of Section 2 implies iH + jH + lH >i L + jL + lL but is silent on
the magnitude of the diﬀerence. Measured employment per blueprint may not reﬂect
eﬀective labor used per blueprint if workers diﬀer in ability. Panels (iii) and (iv) of
Figure II and the lower panel of Figure III show the size and age distributions for a
benchmark calibration in which a single employee is assigned to every blueprint. A
fraction α = .4 of new ﬁrms start out as high-growth ﬁrms. In the low-growth regime,
the rates at which ﬁrms gain and lose blueprints are μL = λL = .2500,a n dﬁrms in this
regime exit randomly at a rate δL = .02.13 In the high-growth regime, ﬁrms also lose
blueprints at the rate λH = .2500, but they gain blueprints at the higher rate μH = .3825.
Firms transition from the high-growth to the low-growth regime at a rate δH = .125,
resulting in a tail index ζ =( η + δH)/(μH − λH) ≈ 1.02. These parameters imply an
exit rate of about 11% and Figures II and III show that these parameters closely match
the observed size and age distributions. Holding ﬁxed the other parameters, increasing
the fraction α of high-growth new ﬁrms lowers the entry rate below, and increases the
number of large ﬁrms above what is observed in the data. Jointly changing (μH,δH) to
(μH + ∆,δH + ∆) changes the exit rate and the size distribution very little but shifts
the age distribution of large ﬁrms. At δH = δL = .02, the age distribution is essentially
that of the one-regime economy, while the median age of large ﬁrms can be as low as 50
years when δH = .25.
But what about Gibrat’s law? Many researchers ﬁnd that Gibrat’s law is a good
approximation for ﬁrms that are not too small (e.g., Hall [1987] and Evans [1987]).
Figure IV shows the mean and standard deviation of the growth rates of surviving ﬁrms
conditional on employment size. The mean growth rates are shown for three horizons:
instantaneous, one year, and ﬁve years. Survivorship bias aﬀects the instantaneous mean
only for ﬁrms with one employee. The probability of the multiple blueprint losses it takes
to induce exit is second order for ﬁrms with more than one employee. For the longer
horizons commonly used in empirical studies this is no longer true, and surviving small
ﬁrms grow much faster on average than the unconditional mean. But this eﬀect declines
r a t h e rq u i c k l yw i t hs i z e ,a n dm e a ng r o w t hr a t e sd on o ts h o wm u c hv a r i a t i o nw i t hs i z e
overall (the horizontal scale is logarithmic).
Over short intervals of time, the variance of surviving ﬁrm growth rates in phase
I ∈ {H,L} is (μI + λI)/n for ﬁrm with n>1 blueprints and μI for ﬁrms with one
13The US Bureau of Labor Statistics reports monthly job separation rates for the 2000s that add up
to around 50% on an annual basis. The parameter values λH = λL = .25 can be interpreted to mean
that half of these separations do not correspond to job destruction, but to worker replacement.
27blueprint. The calibration implies that this adds up to a standard deviation among all
surviving ﬁrms of about 41% per annum. This is well within the range of standard
deviations reported in Davis et al. [2007]. For ﬁrms with more than one blueprint, the
calibration implies a standard deviation of a ﬁrm with n blueprints is about .80/
√
n in
the high-growth phase and .71/
√
n in the low-growth phase. This makes for very volatile
growth rates among small ﬁrms. But for ﬁrms with more than 10,000 employees, these
standard deviations will be less than 1% per annum. Even for a model without aggregate
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Fljxuh IV Growth Rates by Firm Size
As emphasized by Klette and Kortum [2004], the empirical evidence suggests that
the variance of ﬁrm growth rates declines more slowly than 1/n. Hymer and Pashigian
[1962] compared standard deviations of ﬁrm growth rates across size quartiles and found
that ﬁrms in the largest quartile were signiﬁcantly more volatile than predicted by the
1/n rule. More recently, Stanley et al. [1996] and Sutton [2002] ﬁnd that the variance
of the growth rate of Compustat ﬁrms behaves like 1/n1/3, and tentative interpretations
are given in Stanley et al. [1996] and Sutton [2002, 2007]. However, most ﬁrms are not
publicly traded and are not covered by Compustat, and it is possible that these studies
miss a rapid decline in variance that happens for small n.
285. Crqfoxvlrq
Skewed ﬁrm size distributions are interpreted as reﬂecting skewed productivity distribu-
tions in Hopenhayn [1992], Atkeson and Kehoe [2005], and Luttmer [2007], among many
others. The current paper attributes size diﬀerences not only to productivity diﬀerences
but also to stochastic variation in the number of markets in which a ﬁrm operates, as in
Klette and Kortum [2004], Lentz and Mortensen [2006], and Arkolakis [2006]. Bounded
productivity diﬀerences may give rise to unbounded size diﬀerences. In Lucas [1978], all
variation in ﬁrm size is determined by heterogeneity in managerial talent. In Holmes
and Schmitz [1995], Gabaix and Landier [2008] and Tervi
..
o [2008], both ﬁrm-speciﬁc
productivity and managerial productivity play a role. Much remains to be done to sort
out the relative importance of each of these aspects of ﬁrm heterogeneity.
Figure I and the relative young age of large ﬁrms are interpreted here using a two-
phase pattern of growth in which some new ﬁrms start out with a high-quality blueprint
and become ﬁrms with all low-quality blueprints after some random time. This is an
abstraction that helps to illustrate the type of growth mechanism that can explain the
size and age distribution of large ﬁrms. One expects more gradual declines in relative
quality to work as well. A natural extension would allow for start-up blueprints that are
initially of uncertain quality. This would bring in the selection considerations emphasized
by Jovanovic [1982].
If blueprints are location speciﬁc, and locations are known to diﬀer in how proﬁtable
they can be, then ﬁrms with new ideas will initially implement these in the more prof-
itable locations, and only then expand, at a slower pace, into less attractive locations.
T h i sc o u l db ea na l t e r n a t i v ei n t e r p r e t a t i o no ft h eg r o w t hp a t t e r n ss h o w ni nF i g u r eI ,
although it remains to be seen how this can account for the observed size distribution.
One possibility is suggested by static models of Pareto-like size distributions. A well-
known example is the Beckmann [1958] model of hierarchies of cities. More recently,
Hsu [2007] describes an equilibrium model of hierarchies of ﬁrms and cities that produces
Zipf’s law. These static models could be viewed as long-run equilibrium conditions for
ad y n a m i ce c o n o m y ,a n dt h e nt h er a p i di n i t i a lg r o w t hs h o w ni nF i g u r eIw o u l ds i m p l y
reﬂect the fact that setting up a large ﬁrm is not quite instantaneous but still very fast.
Firms can grow along many margins. They can introduce new goods, build new
plants, open new sales oﬃces, hire new workers, win new customers, acquire whole new
divisions. The framework sketched in this paper can be extended to incorporate these
elements and arrive at a richer description of ﬁrm growth and heterogeneity. A close
examination of the early histories of large U.S. corporations, such as those shown in
29Figure I and the ones described in Appendix A, shows that mergers, acquisitions, and
spin-oﬀs are by no means infrequent. Along the lines of Jovanovic and Rousseau [2002],
it is possible to interpret a small acquisition as the production of a new blueprint, but
other interpretations are perhaps more natural. Spin-oﬀs can give rise to ﬁrms that enter
with a relatively large initial size, instead of the common minimum size assumed in this
paper. It would be interesting to know if an account can be given of these aspects of
ﬁrm growth that is consistent with the observed size distribution.
AF lup Epsor|phqw dqg Ajh Ddwd
The employment histories shown in Figure I were collected from Compustat, historical
Moody’s Manuals, and corporate web sites. Most employment histories are incomplete.
Abbott Laboratories, Dow Chemical, IBM, and Procter and Gamble were founded in
the 19th century, and all other companies shown in Figure 1 during the 20th century.
The ﬁrm age data used in Section 4 were collected from several sources. Large ﬁrms
are taken to be all Compustat ﬁrms headquartered in the US with more than 10,000
employees, and ﬁrms in the same size category that appear on a list of large privately
held US companies published by Forbes magazine, both in 2008. Compustat and Forbes
tend to use a broad measure of ﬁrm employment. Employment at foreign subsidiaries is
included, and franchisee employees appear to be counted as employees of the franchisor.
The number of large ﬁrms obtained in this way is 813, which is somewhat less than the
953 ﬁrms with more than 10,000 employees reported by the SBA for 2006. In part this
may be because ﬁrms headquartered outside the US are not included here. For example,
Shell Oil Company is incorporated in the US but is a wholly-owned subsidiary of an
English company headquartered in The Netherlands.
The date of incorporation of publicly traded ﬁrms was taken from the synopsis section
of the Mergent Online database. For all ﬁrms, the foundation date is the date of the
earliest reference to the company or its known predecessor companies that can be found
in the company history section of the Mergent Online database, or on company web sites.
In cases where this information is not available or does not appear to refer to the earliest
times of the company, three additional sources were consulted: Dun and Bradstreet’s
Million Dollar Database, Hoover’s Company Reports, and the International Directory
of Company Histories. In the case of privately held companies, Hoover’s is the primary
source. In a few cases, company age data were found in the Encyclopedia Britannica or
in books available in the Google Books online library.
30The Mergent Online database contains extensive records on now defunct corporations
that were sometimes used to further trace back the origins of a company. Corporate web
sites of large companies often include extensive company histories that tend to emphasize
t h ev e r yo l dr o o t so ft h eﬁrm. Occasionally, the foundation date is taken to be the date its
founding entrepreneur ﬁrst started a business in the same industry, even if the company
that eventually became large was not the ﬁrst company started by the entrepreneur.
In the data collected here, mergers are an important source of ﬁrm growth that is not
accounted for by the models in this paper. In many cases, a company history includes
t h ey e a ri nw h i c ht h eo l d e s tk n o w nc o m p o n e n to faﬁrm was founded. But in some
industries, notably the health care industry, such information is almost non-existent.
The models in this paper also do not allow for spinoﬀs. In the data set constructed
here, a company that was already large at the time of its spinoﬀ is taken to be founded
at the time its parent was founded, when this information is available. Clearly, future
empirical and theoretical work needs to account explicitly for mergers and spinoﬀs. The
company age data together with the source for each age observation are available at
www.luttmer.org.
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Throughout this appendix, let θ, μ  = λ and θ − (μ − λ) be positive, and take {An}∞
n=1


















for all n ∈ N. Then the second-order diﬀerence equation (33) is equivalent to the pair
of ﬁrst-order diﬀerence equations









for all n ∈ N, combined with the initial condition Z0 =0 .
Lemma A1 The sequence {βn}∞
n=0 increases monotonically from 0 to min{1,λ/μ}.I f
μ > λ then limn→∞ n(1 − μβn/λ)=θ/(μ − λ).I fμ < λ then limn→∞n(1 − βn)=
θ/(λ − μ).
31T h ep r o o fc a nb eg i v e nu s i n gd i a g r a m sf o rt h er e c u r s i o n st h a td e ﬁne βn, n(1−μβn−1/λ)
and n(1−βn−1), respectively. Note that n = ∞ in (34) yields a quadratic equation that
is solved by β∞ ∈ {1,λ/μ}.











for all n ∈ N.N o t et h a tB1 = C0 =1 , Cn/Cn−1 = μβn/λ, and (35) can be written as
BnYn = BnZn + Bn+1Yn+1 and Zn/Cn = Zn−1/Cn−1 + An/(nCn−1). We are interested
only in solutions to (33) that are non-negative and summable. Since Bn ≤ 1,t h i s
implies that any such solution must satisfy limn→∞ Bn+1Yn+1 =0 . Given this boundary












for all n ∈ N. The following lemma collects some facts that are useful in determining
the properties of Yn.
Lemma A2 Let {an}∞




































and Raabe’s test says that {an}∞
n=1 is summable if δ > 1 and not if δ < 1.
A version of (38) for regularly varying functions is discussed as part of Karamata’s
Theorem in Bingham, Goldie and Teugels [1987]. See Bojanic and Seneta [1973] for
regularly varying sequences.
Suppose now that all An are positive and that limn→∞ n(1−An+1/An)=ζA ∈ (0,∞]
is well deﬁned. Also write γ =l i m n→∞ An+1/An in situations in which this limit is well
deﬁned. Deﬁne ζC = limn→∞ n(1 − Cn+1/Cn).B y L e m m a A 1 ,ζC = θ/(μ − λ) > 1 if
32μ > λ and ζC = ∞ if μ < λ.T h el a r g e - n behavior of Yn c a nb ei n f e r r e df r o mt h ef a c t










wn,k = ω, lim
n→∞xn = ξ (40)
for some ω and ξ in [0,∞).T h i si m p l i e st h a tlimn→∞ Yn/Tn = ωξ.
WhenCn declines more slowly than An, the following representation works









As long as μ  = λ, Lemma A1 implies Bn+1Cn+1/(BnCn) → min{λ/μ,μ/λ} ∈ (0,1) and
then (37) gives ω =1 /(1−min{λ/μ,μ/λ}).I fμ/λ > 1 and ζC < ζA ≤∞then Raabe’s
test implies that xn converges to some ξ < ∞. The same is true if γ < μ/λ < 1.
When μ > λ and An declines more slowly than Cn, consider the representation












Now Lemma A1 implies An+1Bn+1/(AnBn) → λ/μ ∈ (0,1) and (37) gives ω =1 /(1 −
λ/μ).S i n c eζA < ζC, (38) implies ξ =1 /(ζC − ζA).
When μ < λ and An declines more slowly than Cn,c o n s i d e r













L e m m aA 1i m p l i e sn(1 − Bn+1/Bn) → θ/(λ − μ) > 0 and Cn/Cn−1 → μ/λ ∈ (0,1).
Furthermore, n(1−An+1Bn+1/(AnBn)) → ζA+θ/(λ−μ) > 0 and thus (38) implies ω =
1/[ζA+θ/(λ−μ)].I fζA < ∞ then (Cn+1/An+1)/(Cn/An) → μ/λ ∈ (0,1). Alternatively,
if ζA = ∞ and μ/λ < γ < 1 then (Cn+1/An+1)/(Cn/An) → [μ/λ]/γ ∈ (0,1).I ne i t h e r
case, (37) implies that xn converges to some ξ < ∞.
Finally, note that the representation (39)-(41) also works and limn→∞ Yn/Cn ∈ (0,∞)
if An > 0 for only ﬁnitely many n.
33Proposition A1 Consider the cases (i) An > 0 for ﬁnitely many n, (ii) limn→∞ An+1/
An = γ,a n d( i i i )limn→∞ n(1 − An+1/An)=ζA ∈ (0,∞].T h e nlimn→∞ Yn/Cn ∈ (0,∞)
in case (i), in case (ii) if 1 > μ/λ > γ, and in case (iii) if ζA > ζC. Alternatively,
limn→∞ Yn/An =0in case (ii) if 1 > γ > μ/λ,a n dlimn→∞ Yn/An ∈ (0,∞) in case (iii)
if ζA < ζC.
If we add the restriction ζA > 1 when An > 0 for all n, then Raabe’s test implies that
the solution (36) is in fact summable in all cases. One can generate many more solutions
by adding a positive constant to BnYn, but these cannot be summable.
Proposition A2 Suppose An > 0 for ﬁnitely many n, or limn→∞n(1 − An+1/An)=























Proof It follows from min{ζA,ζC} > 1 that nYn → 0.R e c a l lY0 =0and write (33)
as
θYn = λ[(n +1 ) Yn+1 − nYn − Yn+1] − μ[nYn − (n − 1)Yn−1 − Yn−1]+μAn
for all n ∈ N.A d d i n gu po v e ra l ln and using limn→∞ nYn =0gives the ﬁrst sum. The
second sum follows from directly summing (33).
With these results in place, Proposition 2 follows from taking θ = η, A1 =( η−(μ−λ))/μ
and An+1 =0for n ∈ N. Proposition 3 then follows since part (38) of Lemma A2 shows
that
S∞
k=n Yk/k behaves like Yn ∼ ωξCn,a n dζC ∈ (1,∞).
To prove Proposition 4, let QT,n be the fraction of all blueprints in the economy held
by type-T ﬁrms with n blueprints, where T ∈ {H,L} and n ∈ N. The properties of
QH,n are an application of Propositions 2 and 3. Proposition 4 can be shown by taking
θ = η + δL, (μ,λ)=( μL,λL), A1 =[ ( 1− α)ν + δHQH,1]/μL,a n dAn+1 = δHQH,n+1/μL
for all n ∈ N.
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3.1 Preliminaries
Suppose {Xi,Y i}k
i=1 are 2k independent random variables with Pr[Xi = n]=( 1 −γ)γn−1,
n ∈ N, Pr[Yi =0 ]=θ,a n dPr[Yi =1 ]=1− θ.D e ﬁne Zk =
Sk




34As can be veriﬁed using moment generating functions, the sum of i.i.d. geometrically















for all m ∈ N and n +1− m ∈ N. In view of the independence assumptions,
































for all n ∈ N. The complementary probability is Pr[Zk =0 ]=θ
k since Zk =0if and
only if all Yi are zero. Also,
S∞
n=1 nPr[Zk = n]=k ×(1−θ)/(1−γ). This can be used
to compute the mean growth rates conditional on survival reported in Figure IV.
Now suppose that K is drawn from the geometric distribution (1 − σ)σk−1,k∈ N.

































for all N ∈ N.F o rN =1this yields Pr[Zk =0 ]=( 1− σ)θ/(1 − σθ).
3.2 Sketch of Proof and Computation
Suppose δ =0 .C o n s i d e raﬁrm that starts out with one blueprint. As reported in Klette
and Kortum [2004], by age a such a ﬁrm will have exited with probability T0,1(a)=
λ
μγ(a). Conditional on survival, its size distribution is the geometric size distribution
Tn,1(a)/[1 − T0,1(a)] = [1 − γ(a)]γn−1(a).T h i sc a nb ev e r i ﬁed directly by checking (26)-
(27). The size distribution at age a of a ﬁrm that starts out with k blueprints is simply
the distribution of the aggregate of k independent ﬁr m st h a ts t a r tw i t ho n eb l u e p r i n t .
Applying (42) gives {Tn,k(a)}∞
n=1 for the case δ =0 .N o w s u p p o s e δ > 0. Transitions
35from the ﬁrst to the second phase occur at a rate δ, as long as no exit has taken place.
This means that only a fraction e−δa of surviving ﬁrms remain in the initial phase.
This determines {Tn,k(a)}∞
n=1.T h e f o r m u l a s f o r T−1,k(a) and T0,k(a) then follow from
integrating (25)-(26), as described in the text.
The inﬁnite sums needed in (28) and (29) follow from (43) and (44). Age densities
(distributions) can then be computed using a univariate (bivariate) numerical integra-
tion.
Rhihuhqfhv
[1] Arkolakis, Costas, “Market Access Costs and the New Consumers Margin in Inter-
national Trade,” working paper, University of Minnesota (2006).
[2] Armington, Catherine, “Statistics on U.S. Businesses–Microdata and Tables,”
Small Business Administration (1998).
[3] Atkeson, Andrew, and Patrick Kehoe, “Modelling and Measuring Organization
Capital,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 113, no. 5 (2005), 1026-1051.
[4] Axtell, Robert L., “Zipf Distribution of U.S. Firm Sizes,” Science, CCXCIII (2001),
1818-1820.
[5] Beckmann, M.J., “City Hierarchies and the Distribution of City Size,” Economic
Development and Cultural Change, vol. 6, no. 3 (1958), 243-248.
[6] Bernard, Andrew B., Stephen J. Redding, and Peter K. Schott, “Multi-Product
Firms and Product Switching,” NBER working paper no. 12293 (2006).
[7] Bingham, N.H., C.M. Goldie and J.L. Teugels, Regular Variation, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press (1987).
[8] Bojanic, Ranko and Eugene Seneta, “A Uniﬁed Theory of Regularly Varying Se-
quences,” Mathematische Zeitschrift, vol. 134 (1973), 91-106.
[9] Boldrin, Michele, and David K. Levine, “Perfectly Competitive Innovation,” work-
ing paper (1999, 2006).
[10] Chatterjee, Satyajit and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, “Spin-oﬀsa n dt h eM a r k e tf o r
Ideas” (2006).
36[11] Davis, Steven J., John Haltiwanger, Ron Jarmin and Javier Miranda, “Volatility
and Dispersion in Business Growth Rates: Publicly Traded versus Privately Held
Firms,” NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2006, Volume 21,e d i t e db yD a r o nA c e -
moglu, Kenneth Rogoﬀ and Michael Woodford, 107-156 (2007).
[12] Dixit, Avinash K., and Joseph E. Stiglitz, “Monopolistic Competition and Optimum
Product Diversity,” American Economic Review, LXVII (1977), 297-308.
[13] Dunne, Timothy, Mark J. Roberts, and Larry Samuelson, “The Growth and Failure
of U.S. Manufacturing Plants,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, CIV (1989), 671-
698.
[14] Evans, D.S., “The Relationship between Firm Growth, Size and Age: Estimates for
100 Manufacturing Industries,” Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. XXXV, no. 4
(1987), 567-581.
[15] Gabaix, Xavier, “Zipf’s Law for Cities: An Explanation,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, CXIV (1999), 739-367.
[16] Gabaix, Xavier and Augustin Landier, “Why Has CEO Pay Increased so Much,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 123, no. 1 (2008), 49-100.
[17] Grossman, G. and E. Helpman, Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy,
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA (1991).
[18] Hall, B. H., “The Relationship between Firm Size and Firm Growth in the US
Manufacturing Sector,” Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. XXXV, no. 4 (1987),
583-605.
[19] Holmes, Thomas J., “The Diﬀusion of Wal-Mart and Economies of Density,” Uni-
versity of Minnesota working paper (2006).
[20] Holmes, Thomas J. and James A. Schmitz, Jr., “On the Turnover of Business Firms
and Business Managers,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 103, no. 5 (1995), 1005-
1038.
[21] Hopenhayn, Hugo, “Entry, Exit and Firm Dynamics in Long Run Equilibrium,”
Econometrica, vol. 60, no. 5 (1992), 1127-1150.
[22] Hsu, Wen-Tai, “Central Place Theory and Zipf’s Law,” working paper, University
of Minnesota (2007).
37[23] Hymer, Stephen and Peter Pashigian, “Firm Size and Rate of Growth,” Journal of
Political Economy,v o l .7 0 ,n o .6( 1 9 6 2 ) ,5 5 6 - 5 6 9 .
[24] Ijiri, Yuji, and Herbert A. Simon, “Business Firm Growth and Size,” American
Economic Review, LIV (1964), 77-89.
[25] Jackson, Matthew O., “The Economics of Social Networks,” in Proceedings of the
9th World Congress of the Econometric Society, edited by Richard Blundell, Witney
Newey, and Torsten Persson, 1-56, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge MA
(2006).
[26] Jackson, Matthew O. and Brian W. Rogers, “Meeting Strangers and Friends of
Friends: How Random Are Social Networks,” American Economic Review,v o l .9 7 ,
no. 3 (2007), 890-915.
[27] Jovanovic, Boyan, “Selection and the Evolution of Industry,” Econometrica,C
(1982), 649-670.
[28] Jovanovic, Boyan and Peter L. Rousseau, “A Q-Theory of Mergers,” American
Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, vol. 92, no. 2 (2002), 198-204.
[29] Kendall, David G., “On the Generalized Birth-and-Death Process,” The Annals of
Mathematical Statistics, vol. 19, no. 1 (1948), 1-15.
[30] Klette, Tor Jakob, and Samuel S. Kortum, “Innovating Firms and Aggregate Inno-
vation,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 112, no. 5 (2004), 986-1018.
[31] Krugman, Paul, The Self-Organizing Economy, Blackwell Publishers (1996).
[32] Lentz, Rasmus and Dale T. Mortensen, “An Empirical Model of Growth Through
Product Innovation,” University of Wisconsin and Northwestern University (2006).
[33] Lucas, Robert E., Jr., “On the Size Distribution of Business Firms,” Bell Journal
of Economics, vol. 9, no. 2 (1978), 508-523.
[34] Luttmer, Erzo G.J., “Consumer Search and Firm Growth,” Federal Reserve Bank
of Minneapolis working paper no. 645 (2006).
[35] Luttmer, Erzo G.J., “Selection, Growth, and the Size Distribution of Firms,” Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, vol. 122, no. 3 (2007), 1103-1144.
38[36] Luttmer, Erzo G.J., “On the Mechanics of Firm Growth,” Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis Working Paper no. 657 (2008).
[37] Prescott, E.C. and M. Visscher, “Organization Capital,” Journal of Political Econ-
omy, vol. 88, no. 3 (1980), 446-461.
[38] Romer, P.M., “Endogenous Technical Change,” Journal of Political Economy,v o l .
98, no. 5, S71-S102 (1990).
[39] Rosen, S., “Substitution and Division of Labour,” Economica, vol. 45, no. 179
(1978), 235-250.
[40] Rossi-Hansberg, Esteban and Mark L.J. Wright, “Establishment Size Dynamics in
t h eA g g r e g a t eE c o n o m y , ”American Economic Review, vol. 97, no. 5 (2007), 1639-
1666.
[41] Seker, Murat, “A Structural Model of Establishment and Industry Evolution: Evi-
dence from Chile,” working paper, University of Minnesota (2007).
[42] Simon, Herbert A., “On a Class of Skew Distribution Functions,” Biometrika,v o l .
42, no. 3/4 (1955), 425-440.
[43] Simon, Herbert A., and Charles P. Bonini, “The Size Distribution of Business
Firms,” American Economic Review, XCVIII (1958), 607-617.
[44] Stanley, R. Michael, L.A.N. Amaral, S.V. Buldyrev, S. Harlin, H. Leschorn, P.
Maass, M.A. Salinger, H.E. Stanley, “Scaling Behavior in the Growth of Compa-
nies,” Nature 319 (1996), 804-806.
[45] Sutton, John, “Gibrat’s Legacy,” Journal of Economic Literature,v o l .X X X V
(1997), 40-59.
[46] Sutton, John, “The Variance of Firm Growth Rates: The ‘Scaling’ Puzzle,” Physica
A, CCCXII (2002), 577-590.
[47] Sutton, John, “Market Share Dynamics and the ‘Persistence of Leadership’ Debate,”
American Economic Review, vol. 97, no. 1 (2007), 222-241.
[48] Tervi
..
o, Marko, “The Diﬀerence That CEOs Make: An Assignment Model Ap-
proach,” American Economic Review, vol. 98, no. 3 (2008), 642-668.
39[49] Young, A., “Growth Without Scale Eﬀects,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 106,
no. 1 (1998), 41-63.
[50] Yule, G. Udny, “A Mathematical Theory of Evolution Based on the Conclusions of
Dr. J.C. Willis, F.R.S.,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London,
Series B, Containing Papers of a Biological Character, vol. 213 (1925), 21-87.
40